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Abstract A close coupling of perception and action
processes is assumed to play an important role in basic
capabilities of social interaction, such as guiding attention
and observation of others’ behavior, coordinating the form
and functions of behavior, or grounding the understanding
of others’ behavior in one’s own experiences. In the
attempt to endow artificial embodied agents with similar
abilities, we present a probabilistic model for the integra-
tion of perception and generation of hand-arm gestures via
a hierarchy of shared motor representations, allowing for
combined bottom-up and top-down processing. Results
from human-agent interactions are reported demonstrating
the model’s performance in learning, observation, imita-
tion, and generation of gestures.
Keywords Computational model  Interactive artificial
agents  Nonverbal communication  Gestures 
Perception-action links
Introduction
In social interactions, one is continuously confronted with
an intricate complexity of verbal and nonverbal behavior,
including hand-arm gestures, body movements or facial
expressions. All of these behaviors can be indicative of the
other’s referential, communicative, or social intentions [1].
In this paper, we focus on hand-arm gestures. Interlocutors
in social interaction incessantly and concurrently produce
and perceive a variety of gestures. The generation of a hand-
arm gesture, coarsely, consists of two steps. First, finding
the proper gesture for an intention that is to be realized
under current context constraints. Second, performing the
gesture using one’s motor repertoire. Similarly, the reci-
pient perceives and analyzes the other’s movement both at
motor and at intention levels. Cumulating evidence suggests
that these two processes are not separate, but that recog-
nizing and understanding a gesture is grounded in the per-
ceiver’s own motor repertoire [2, 3]. In other words, a hand
movement is understood, at least partially, by evoking the
motor system of the observer. This is evidenced by so-
called motor resonances showing that the motor and action
(premotor) systems become activated during both perfor-
mance and observation of bodily behavior [4–6]. One
hypothesis is that these neural resonances reflect the
involvement of the motor system in deriving predictions
and evaluating hypotheses about the incoming observations.
This integration of perception and action enables imitating
or mimicking the observed behavior, either overtly or
covertly, and thus forms an embodied basis for under-
standing other embodied agents [7], and for communication
and intersubjectivity of intentional agents more generally
(cf. simulation theory [8]). Hence, perception-action links
(and resulting resonances) are assumed to be effective at
various levels of a hierarchical perceptual-motor system,
from kinematic features to motor commands to goals and
intentions [9], whereas these levels interact bi-directionally;
bottom-up and top-down [10]. Further, a close perception-
action integration can be assumed to support two important
ingredients of social interaction: First, fast and often sub-
conscious inter-personal coordinations (e.g., alignment,
mimicry, interactional synchrony) that lead to rapport [11]
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and social resonance [12] between interactants. Second,
social learning of behavior by means of imitation, which
helps to acquire and interactively establish behavior
through connected perceiving, processing, and reproducing
of their pertinent features. All of these aforementioned
effects may also apply—at least to a certain extent—to the
interaction between humans and embodied agents, be it
physical robots or virtual characters (see [12] for a detailed
discussion). For example, brain imaging studies [13, 14]
showed that artificial agents with sufficiently natural
appearance and movements can evoke motor resonances in
human observers.
Against this background, we aim for interactive
embodied systems ultimately able to engage in social
interactions, in a human-like manner, based on cognitively
plausible mechanisms. A central ingredient is a computa-
tional model for integrated perception and generation of
hand-arm gestures. This model has to fulfill a number of
requirements: (1) perceiving and generating behavior in a
fast, robust, and incremental manner, (2) concurrent and
mutually interacting perception and generation, (3) con-
current processing at different levels of motor abstraction,
from movement trajectories to intentions; (4) incremental
construction of hierarchical knowledge structures through
learning from observation and imitation.
In this paper, we present a cognitive computational
model that has been devised and developed to meet the
above-mentioned requirements for the domain of hand-arm
gestures. Focusing on the motor aspect of gestures, it
should also serve as a basis for future modeling of higher
cognitive levels of social intentions. In the section ‘‘Shared
Motor Knowledge Model’’, we introduce the Shared Motor
Knowledge Model that serves as a basis for integrating
perception and action, both of which operate upon these
knowledge structures by means of forward/inverse models.
In ‘‘A Probabilistic Model of Motor Resonances’’ we
present a probabilistic approach to simulate fast, incre-
mental and concurrent resonances and their exploitation of
these structures in both perceiving and generating behavior.
Section ‘‘Perception-Action Integration’’ details how the
integration of perception and action is achieved in this
model and how this helps to model and cope with char-
acteristics of nonverbal human social interaction. Results
of applying this model to real-world data (marker-free
gesture tracking) from a human-agent interaction scenario
are reported in ‘‘Results’’. In the final section we discuss
our work in comparison to other related work.
Shared Motor Knowledge Model
In previous work [15], we have presented a cognitive
model for hierarchical representations of motor knowledge
for hand-arm gestures, and we proposed how these struc-
tures can be utilized for probabilistic ‘‘embodied’’ behavior
perception. Here, we present an extended version of this
model that serves as a unified basis for both perception and
generation of hand-arm movements (wrist position trajec-
tories, to be specific) as they occur in natural gesturing by
human users in interaction with a humanoid virtual agent.
Overall, the model consists of three main modules (see
Fig. 1): shared motor knowledge, perception and genera-
tion. This model allows for parallel gesture generation and
perception processes grounded in shared motor knowledge.
Further, the hierarchical model enables bottom-up pro-
cessing (mainly for perceptual tasks) interacting bidirec-
tionally with top-down processing (for action production as
well as attention and perception guidance). In the remain-
der of this section, we describe each module separately.
Shared Motor Knowledge
The central shared motor knowledge module (see Fig. 2 for
a detailed view) consists of a hierarchical representation of
hand-arm gestural movements, and a pair of forward and
inverse model submodules, interacting with the movement
representation.
Shared Representation of Motor Knowledge
The representation of motor knowledge for hand-arm
gestures is a hierarchical structure comprising different
levels of abstraction, starting from the form of single
gesture performances in terms of movement trajectories
and leading into less contextualized motor levels, toward
meaning. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the representation
Fig. 1 Overall model for
cognitive processes of
embodied perception and
generation, integrated in a
shared motor knowledge
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hierarchy consists of three levels: motor commands, motor
programs and motor schemas.
At the lowest level, a directed graph is used to store
motor knowledge about gestural movements for each hand.
Nodes represent spatial positions of the wrists and edges
represent trajectories of movement segments. Edges are
referred to here as motor commands (MC). These are
extracted from the trajectories of observed movements,
regarding their velocity profiles. The resulting motor
commands encode one of the three basic forms of move-
ment segments: straight, curved or s-shaped trajectories.
These motor commands only parametrize the significant
spatiotemporal features of movement trajectories (e.g.
extent, shape, timing) as needed by our motor control
engine ACE [16]. In this way, a movement corresponds to
a sequence of motor commands, i.e., a path through the
graph. Neurobiological studies showed that motor systems
use a similar principle of decomposing complex move-
ments into simpler elements, called motor primitives, and
performs them in parallel or sequence [17, 18].
The next level consists of nodes associated with motor
programs (MP), each of which represents a whole perfor-
mance of a gesture. That is, a motor program is associated
with a sequence of motor commands for each hand. For
example, the representation of a waving gesture could
consist of four motor commands: raising the right hand
(mc1), moving it to the right (mc2), moving it to the left
(mc3) and retracting it back to the rest position (mc4). This
performance of a waving gesture with the right hand can be
represented by a motor program (mp1), which sequentially
connects mc1, mc2 and mc3 repeatedly to represent the
swinging movement, and finally mc4. A different gesture,
like drawing a circle at the same height as waving, can also
encompass some of these motor commands in its motor
program (e.g., mc1 and mc4 for raising and lowering the
right hand). That way, the agent has a compact represen-
tation of various gesture performances stored in its motor
program repertoire.
However, in general, gestures are neither limited to a
specific performance nor exhibit only invariant spatiotem-
poral features. The variant features are the performance
parameters that, when varied, do not change the meaning
and intention of the gesture but the way of performing it.
Consequently, understanding a gesture might not only
involve a direct matching, but also needs inference of
intended function. For example, seeing a demonstrator
waving should be recognized as waving, the symbolic
meaning of which is independent of the absolute spatial
position of the hands, the swinging frequency, the per-
forming hand or to some degree the velocity of the
movement. Although different persons have different styles
of waving and different ways of modulating its meaning
(e.g. cheerful vs. hesitant), those performances can still be
recognized by an observer as instances of waving. And,
when reciprocating, the observer likewise performs it in an
individual manner. Thus, the motor representation must be
able to cluster numerous variants of a gestural movement
into one ‘‘schema’’. Therefore, we define motor schema
(MS) as a generalized representation that groups different
possible performances (motor programs) together. Such a
generalization process is an important capability and can
foster the understanding and imitation of behavior in two
ways. First, it forwards the problem of inferring the
intention behind a gesture from a specific performance to a
more abstract, yet less complex level, namely schema
interpretation. Second, an agent can retain its own personal
form of performing a gesture while being able to relate
other performances of the same gesture to the same
schema.
Forward and Inverse Models
The motor system employs two internal models for pre-
diction and motor control. These internal models have been
hypothesized to exist in the human cerebellum [19].
A forward model implements causal and temporal
Fig. 2 Modules of
‘‘perception’’ and ‘‘shared
motor knowledge’’ in detail.
Shared motor knowledge
comprises three different levels
of abstraction representing
motor knowledge as a
hierarchical graph. The
representation of a sample
waving gesture is highlighted
in bold lines
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predictions of a movement, providing likely next movement
states, given the current state and possible efferent control
signals. In other words, forward models are able to predict
the continuation of movements during both perception and
generation processes, using sensory and/or proprioceptive
feedback. In contrast, an inverse model provides motor
commands that are likely to achieve a desired movement
state. That means learning a movement skill is largely
equivalent to acquiring corresponding inverse and forward
models. On this basis, our motor knowledge model is
endowed with a pair of generic inverse and forward models,
which can operate on the hierarchical motor representation
at all levels. Many computational models assume a multi-
tude of pairings of such internal models, containing the
necessary motor knowledge for prediction and control of
individual movements [20]. In contrast, our model is geared
to the flexibility and generativity of gestural communica-
tion. Motor knowledge is thus integrated in the shared
motor representation as an expandable graph and the for-
ward and inverse submodules are seen as generic processors
that perform the corresponding tasks on arbitrary elements
of the graph representation.
Perception Process
The perception module receives visual stimuli about
movements of relevant body parts of a demonstrator
(positions of the wrists in this case). First, these are pre-
processed such that they can be directly operated upon for
recognizing familiar gestures or learning new ones. The
preprocessing pipeline, illustrated in Fig. 2, consists of four
submodules: (1) the observations are first transformed
(rotated and scaled) by a body correspondence solver from
external coordinate system to egocentric space of the vir-
tual agent, which stays face-to-face to the human inter-
locutor, (2) the sensory memory is an ultra short-term
memory that receives the transformed positions and buffers
them in chronological order; (3) the working memory holds
a continuous trajectory for each hand through agent-centric
space and, (4) the segmenter submodule decomposes the
received trajectory into movement segments called guiding
strokes [16], based on their spatial and kinematic features
(velocity drops, changes of movement direction). A guid-
ing stroke represents a simple and short movement segment
in 3D space and describes the movement path as well as
kinematics along this segment in terms of a few parameters
(see [21] for similar preprocessing steps). Since the focus
of this paper is on intransitive (i.e., not object-directed)
movements, all parameters attributed to the segments refer
only to their morphological features and are not defined
relative to an object. Such parametrized segments are the
atomic movement components that form the motor com-
mands in the shared motor knowledge representation.
While perceiving hand movements, the perception
module employs the shared motor knowledge as follows:
Candidates of known gestures that might correspond to the
movement currently being observed are passed on to the
forward models which derive predictions of the corre-
sponding likely continuation of the movement. This prin-
ciple is applied at all levels of motor knowledge in parallel.
At the lowest level, predictions are evaluated against the
positions of the wrist received at each time step from the
working memory; at higher levels (programs, schemas),
predictions are derived and evaluated against the corre-
sponding structures at lower levels. The results of these
evaluations are fed back into the shared motor knowledge
as ‘‘motor resonances’’ in the graph. Those resonances and
the evaluation processes that spawn them are modeled
probabilistically and described in ‘‘A Probabilistic Model
of Motor Resonances’’ in detail. Here we note that strong
motor resonance of a motor component (motor command,
program or schema) indicates a successful prediction of the
observed movement by the corresponding forward model at
that level. Strong motor resonance corresponds to high
confidence of the virtual agent in recognizing the corre-
sponding movement, grounded in its own motor experi-
ence. In contrast, if none of the motor components at one
level resonated sufficiently, i.e., no sufficiently similar
motor representation exists at that level, an unfamiliar
movement segment or gesture performance is likely being
observed. In this case, the analyses switch from the forward
model to the inverse model at the corresponding level.
As aforementioned, inverse models capture motor
specifications to achieve a desired state. For this purpose,
inverse models receive movement segments from the seg-
menter and augment the motor representation graph with
new components, which represent the new movement at the
proper level of abstraction (for more details about inverse
models at the motor command level see [22]). In this way,
the virtual agent learns new gestures by extending its motor
repertoire. Inverse models could insert new segments as
motor commands, create a new motor program or associate
an old one with a new sequence of motor commands, and
create a new motor schema or associate a new motor
program with a known schema. However, a new associa-
tion between a motor program (performance of a gesture)
and a schema (core meaning of a gesture) cannot be
determined only with the help of the spatiotemporal fea-
tures available in working memory. Concerning those
features, totally different gestures can signal the same
social intention, and therefore, they have to be clustered
together as one schema. However, as intention recognition
is beyond the scope of the present study, we utilize explicit
feedback to cluster different performances of a gesture
schema: the human interlocutor labels each new gesture
with a name, e.g. ‘‘waving’’, which is then used by the
422 Cogn Comput (2011) 3:419–435
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inverse model at motor schema level to associate the cur-
rent performance of waving with the respective schema.
Generation Process
Generation of a gesture is a top-down process that is
invoked by the prior decision to express an intention
through a gesture. In our framework, the performance of a
hand-arm movement by the virtual agent is built on a motor
control engine described in previous work [16]. Here, we
focus on the processes in shared motor knowledge which
result in movement commands to be performed by this
engine. The first step is to select a proper motor schema to
be generated. This decision has to be made by higher
cognitive levels, concerning referential, communicative
and social intentions, which are beyond the scope of this
paper. Therefore, the proper motor schema is currently
directly given in each social situation to the virtual agent.
At the next step, the agent has to select a motor program,
i.e., a possible performance of the selected gesture schema.
This choice is modeled to depend on two criteria: obser-
vation frequency, and previously perceived or self-gener-
ated gestures. The latter refers to the mutual effects of
perception and action handled in ‘‘Perception-Action
Integration’’. The former refers to the agent’s tendency to
perform a gesture in the way it has observed (and recog-
nized) it most often. The corresponding motor program is
referred to as the prototype of that motor schema. Hence,
the prototype gesture of each schema emerges from the
way the majority of human interlocutors with whom the
agent has interacted have performed that gesture. After
choosing a motor program to perform, the next generation
step is simply to follow the unambiguous association
between the selected motor program and the motor com-
mands for both wrists.
A Probabilistic Model of Motor Resonances
As described earlier, motor resonances result from com-
paring predictions with observations. This basic mecha-
nism is employed at all three levels (using different kinds
of forward models to derive the predictions) and the
resulting resonances indicate the agent’s confidence in a
correspondence between what it sees someone doing and
what it knows from own experience.
Motor resonances are modeled probabilistically and are
computed for each motor candidate at each level during
observation. The general approach is to apply Bayesian
inference and is the same for all levels. Given the evidence
e (e.g. visual stimuli of moving hands), we define this
confidence in recognizing a certain motor candidate
(referred to as h for hypothesis) as the mean over time of its
conditional probabilities until the current time T:
PTðhjeÞ :¼ 1T
PT
t¼t1 PðhjetÞ. At each time step, we employ
Bayes’ law and compute the probability P(h|et) as a nor-
malized product of the likelihood and the prior probability
of the same motor candidate: aposteriori ¼ a  likelihood
apriori. To compute the apriori term, we apply the prior
feedback approach [23] to accumulate probabilities up to
each time step. That means apriori at each time step is the
aposteriori from the previous time step. This affords
incremental processing. In other words, the more positive
evidence we have, the higher the recognition confidence
will be. The likelihood term (i.e., P(e|h)) is modeled spe-
cially for the motor candidates at each level (see ‘‘Bottom-
Up Perception’’).
Furthermore, the probabilities of motor candidates at the
three levels influence each other mutually. A Bayesian
network models how the levels of the hierarchy of motor
representation interact (see Fig. 3). This approach allows
motor resonances to percolate bottom-up and top-down
across adjacent levels, to find (possibly a variant of) a known
gesture quickly, effectively and robustly. In the following
section, we first focus on the bottom-up perception process,
from motor commands, to motor programs, to motor sche-
mas. After that we consider the top-down guidance of the
perception process.
Bottom-Up Perception
Level 1: Resonating Motor Commands
At this level, the spatial position of a wrist at each time step
t is our evidence and motor commands in the correspond-
ing graph are the hypotheses. That means, the agent
updates its beliefs in observing each motor command as a
candidate. In order to have a fast and cost-efficient algo-
rithm, we need not consider all motor commands, but only
the subset of the most probable ones, referred to as the set
of active motor command hypotheses Hc. The criterion to
add a motor command to this set is as follows: As soon as
the first evidence, here the observation ot1 , is perceived, its
Fig. 3 Bayesian network for the relations between different levels of
the motor hierarchy
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probability to represent a node in the graph of motor
commands is computed with the aid of Gaussian densities
centered at the position of each node in three-dimensional
space. Comparing it with a predefined threshold yields the
most likely candidate nodes for the starting point of a
gesture. All outgoing motor commands from these nodes
are added to Hc. At the next time steps, the probability of
each of these hypotheses is computed from the new
observation (Eq. 1). If the probability of a hypothesis is
smaller than a predefined threshold, it will be omitted from
Hc, and if a new node becomes likely to be the start of a
new hypothesis, the corresponding hypothesis will be
inserted to Hc. Furthermore, the active hypotheses can
change dynamically and be split into new hypotheses by a
branching node, whereas one of those hypotheses indicates
the belief in stopping the movement at the end of the
passed motor command, and the other hypotheses refer to
the beliefs in possible continuation of the movement
observation.
Employing Bayes’ law, the probability of a motor
command hypothesis c (this equals the resonance) is
updated at each time step on the basis of perceived evi-
dence up to the current time step, T: (o ¼ fot1 ; ot2 ; :::; oTg).
PTðc 2 HcÞ ¼ PTðcjoÞ :¼ 1
T
XT
t¼t1
PðcjotÞ
¼ 1
T
XT
t¼t1
aPT1ðcÞPðotjcÞ ð1Þ
The Bayesian normalizing constant is referred to as a.
The term PT-1(c) is the prior probability of the hypothesis
c and indicates the previous knowledge about the motor
command c, which is equal to the posterior probability of
c at the previous time step, T - 1. The likelihood term
P(ot|c) refers to the probability of passing the coordinate
ot ¼ fxt; yt; ztg with motor command c and, now,
represents a probabilistic prediction of the forward
model. In other words, it represents the probability of
where the hand would be if the agent performed this motor
command c. We model this as a four-dimensional Gaussian
probability density function of {x, y, z, t} (PDF, in short),
formed for each possible motor command, i.e., each
possible continuing movement segment of the wrist in
space (see Fig. 4a). This likelihood term reaches its
maximum value if the observed performance exactly
matches the agent’s own motor execution.
Level 2: Resonating Motor Programs
Resonance of a motor program depends on the probabilities
of its components (i.e., motor commands of each wrist) and
thus, indirectly, on the wrist observations. Similar to motor
commands, we compute the posterior probability of the
hypothesis p considering evidence from both hands (ol and
or) until the current time step, T. The hypothesis with the
highest posterior probability indicates the agent’s belief in
observing that specific program being executed.
PTðp 2 HpÞ ¼ PTðpjHc; ol; orÞ :¼ 1
T
XT
t¼t1
PðpjHc; ol; orÞ
¼ 1
T
XT
t¼t1
aPT1ðpÞ
Y
i2fr;lg
X
c2Hc;i
Pðoi;tjcÞPtðcjpÞ
ð2Þ
The set of motor programs considered as active
hypotheses Hp contains all programs with at least one
active motor command hypothesis in Hc. At each time step,
the computed probability for each active motor program
hypothesis corresponds to the confidence of the agent in
recognizing that motor program for which, in contrast to
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4 a Likelihood of motor
command hypotheses at these
successive time steps, modeled
as four-dimensional Gaussian
density functions that change in
accord with the motor
command. b Likelihood of a
motor program hypothesis,
modeled as one-dimensional
discrete Gaussian density
function, stretched over
associated motor commands.
The density function moves
over time along the sequentially
connected motor commands
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the commands, the morphological properties of the whole
gesture performance are considered. Motor programs with
too small probabilities will be removed from Hp.
Same as motor commands (Eq. 1), the prior probability
is equal to the posterior probability from the previous time
step and a indicates the Bayesian normalization constant.
Most of the gestures which are performed with only one
hand should be recognized regardless of the hand they are
performed with. Since a motor program comprises a
sequence of motor commands for both hands, it can specify
how their probabilities affect the probability of the asso-
ciated motor program. In Eq. 2 both wrists are assumed to
have their own task during performance (therefore, an
AND relation:
Q
i2fr;lg). For example, in referring to a
round shape with a symmetrical gesture, each hand draws
half of a circle. Alternatively, the hands may also be
combined using an OR relation (
P
i [ {r,l}). For instance, a
waving gesture as a motor program can be performed by
the right ‘‘or’’ left hand. The choice whether AND or OR is
used depends on the particular gesture and is determined by
the corresponding schema.
The likelihood term Pt(c|p) indicates the probability of
performing the command c at time t, if the demonstrator
were to perform the program p. This probability is time-
dependent and is modeled using a PDF as a function of
t and the motor commands c. The mean of the Gaussian
moves through the commands of a motor program,
according to the velocity of each motor command
(Fig. 4b). Thus, this term along with P(ot|c) yields the
highest likelihood when observing a gesture performance
with exactly the same movement trajectory and velocity as
the one represented in the own motor repertoire.
Note, however, that these probabilities are incrementally
computed and adjusted from the evidence at hand, also
during perception where only parts of the gesture have been
observed. That is, the agent does not need to specify the
start and end point of gestures, but can recognize gestures
that were started at a later point of a trajectory, e.g., in the
case of several successive gestures without intermediate
rest position, or when observing a gesture partially.
As mentioned in ‘‘Shared Motor Knowledge’’, in the
case of observing an unfamiliar gesture, which cannot be
predicted confidently, the performance will be learned
through the inverse models. However, the decision between
observing a new gesture performance or a familiar one
cannot be made only on the basis of the posterior proba-
bilities of all hypotheses, i.e., all familiar gestures, whose
sum at each time step is 1. Observing an unfamiliar gesture
will assign the highest probability to the most similar motor
program, despite of high deviations in performance.
Therefore, the confidence in recognizing a familiar gesture
depends on the likelihood average over the whole
performance which should be above a predefined rejection
threshold. If this is not the case, the model switches to
acquire the new performance
Level 3: Resonating Motor Schemas
Motor schemas group different motor program hypotheses
into a single one. The probability of each motor schema
hypothesis thus depends on the probabilities of the asso-
ciated motor program hypotheses, and indirectly on the
related motor commands and evidence about each wrist.
Figure 3 illustrates these causal influences between the
graph nodes in a Bayesian network.
In detail, the probability of each schema hypothesis s is
computed as:
PTðs 2 HsÞ ¼ PTðsjHp;Hc;ol;orÞ :¼ 1
T
XT
t¼t1
PðsjHp;Hc;ol;orÞ
¼ 1
T
XT
t¼t1
aPT1ðsÞ
X
p2Hp
PðpjsÞ
Y
i2fr;lg
X
c2Hc;i
Pðoi;tjcÞPtðcjpÞ ð3Þ
The likelihood P(p|s) is taken to be uniformly
distributed among the associated motor programs p with
the active motor schema hypothesis s, and 0 otherwise.
Since a schema can be performed by any of the associated
performances, there is an OR relation among the connected
motor programs (
P
p2Hp ) and the probability of a schema
s is the sum of the probabilities of its possible
performances.
Top-Down Guidance
The described probabilistic model simulates the bottom-up
emergence of resonances in the hierarchical representation,
where probabilistic motor resonances at each level induce
resonances at higher levels. The other way around, higher
levels can also affect the perception process at lower levels
by way of priming. For instance, having recognized a
motor schema unequivocally should yield expectations to
perceive the remaining part of the motor program over the
next time steps. Similarly, recognizing a motor program
should increase the expectation of the associated sub-
sequent motor commands. This top-down information
processing and attention guidance may also directly be
extended into higher social cognitive levels. For instance,
expecting the closing of a dialog could prime an agent to
observe a waving schema.
To achieve this capability, we extend our model by
basically running two update processes for each time step,
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123
one bottom-up and one top-down. The first one acts as
described above and calculates posterior probabilities of all
motor structures given bottom-up evidence using a
Bayesian update. The second one also performs a Bayesian
update but now on the probability of each motor unit
conditioned on the higher-level hypotheses. For example,
consider the probability of each hypothesis at the motor
command level: First, the posterior probability P(c|o) is
determined bottom-up as given in Eq. 1. Then, this pos-
terior probability is used as prior probability P(c) for a
second, top-down update which determines the posterior
probability P(c|p) = a P(p|c)P(c), where the likelihood
term P(p|c) is the current probability of the motor program
p. The resulting probability P(c|p) represents the posterior
probability for the motor command c and is, in turn, taken
as prior probability in the first update process at the next
time step. That way, bottom-up and top-down processing
are connected and contribute both to the emergence of
motor resonances. Likewise, a resonating motor schema
affects the expectation of its comprised motor programs by
applying the top-down update Bayes’ law P(p|s) = a
P(s|p)P(p). Overall, we do not only percolate probabilities
of active hypotheses upward, but also adjust the prior
probabilities of current or future hypotheses top-down in a
context-dependent way. Section ‘‘Results’’ presents results
obtained with this approach applied to real gesture data.
Perception-Action Integration
As discussed in ‘‘Introduction’’, humans employ their
motor expertise for both perception and generation [24].
Similarly, in our model the basic idea is to allow an
embodied virtual agent to create and augment its motor
knowledge by observing others’ gestural movements, and
then to use that knowledge for both perceiving others and
generating movements. This sharing of motor knowledge
directly enables an interaction of both processes in ways
that are observable in humans: on the one hand, behavioral
tendencies of humans are influenced by their perception
and resulting motor resonances [25, 26]; on the other hand,
self-generation of behavior guides attention and increase
sensitivity for subsequent perception of similar movements
(called perceptual resonance [27]). Both resonance phe-
nomena are assumed to play important roles for the con-
tingent processing and coordination of social signals.
In the previous sections, we have presented a hierar-
chical model of motor knowledge and we have shown how
bottom-up and top-down processes probabilistically oper-
ate upon these structures, for perception and generation of
social behavior. To model how perception and action
influence each other, we define a notion of motor neural
activation: neural activation of the motor system is evoked
during both generation and perception processes, it is
assumed to persist in shared knowledge structure, and to
cease slowly over time such that subsequent processing is
affected. Each motor component (motor command, pro-
gram or schema) is assigned a value between 0 and 1
indicating its relative activation. At each time step, this
value is either updated by a generation or perception pro-
cess or, if not, will decay following a sigmoidal decrease
function toward 0. For a motor component m we have:
activationðm; tÞ ¼
1; m is beingperformed at t
PtðmÞ; m isbeing observed with probability P at t
decreaseðmÞ; otherwise
8
><
>:
ð4Þ
The time needed for an activation to cease is set to
depend on the abstraction level: motor command
activations live shortest, while motor schema activations
last longest. Note that these neural activations arise from
perception and generation processes and influence them in
turn. Basically, the activations serve as a ‘‘bridge’’ between
perception and generation processes.
The perception process results in probabilistic motor
resonances at each level, updated at each time step, with the
prior probability of motor candidates set to its previous
posterior probability (see ‘‘A Probabilistic Model of Motor
Resonances’’). At the first time step t1 the prior probabilities
of the active hypotheses at each level are set to their current
activation values normalized by the sum of the activations
of all other active hypotheses at the same level. In this way,
a highly active motor candidate attains a relatively higher
prior probability which corresponds to stronger priming. At
the level of motor commands, the hypotheses can be split
into several child hypotheses at each node. The prior
probability of each child hypothesis is set to a fraction of its
parent posterior probability that is proportional to its rela-
tive activation with respect to other child hypotheses.
During movement generation, the neural activations are
currently only taken into account at the level of motor
programs, since the decision to choose a motor schema is
made by higher levels and motor commands have unam-
biguous relations to the associated motor programs.
Selecting a motor program for a given schema, i.e.,
selecting a specific performance of a gesture, is done
probabilistically according to two criteria: observation
frequency (as explained in ‘‘Generation Process’’) and the
given activations of the candidate motor programs. We
again employ Bayes’ law and select the motor program
p with the highest posterior probability P(p|s). The likeli-
hood term P(s|p) is thereby set to the observation frequency
value of p, relative to other performances of the schema
s. The prior term P(p), similar to the perception case, is
426 Cogn Comput (2011) 3:419–435
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assigned to the current neural motor activation of p, nor-
malized by the sum of activations among all other candi-
date performances. In this way, we consider a combination
of two criteria: (1) how strong the agent is accustomed to
its own individual prototype performance of a schema, and
(2) how high the current neural activations of the corre-
sponding motor components are.
As a result, this use of neural motor activations realizes
perception-action integration by way of probabilistically
biased decision-making. The next section shows simulation
results of this.
Results
The presented model of embodied social signal processing
has been implemented and evaluated against real-world
hand-arm gesture data. In our setup with a 3D time-of-
flight camera (a SwissRangerTM SR40001) and the marker-
free tracking software iisu,2 our humanoid virtual embod-
ied agent Vince observes the wrist trajectories of a human
demonstrator freely performing gestures (see Fig. 5). We
demonstrate the capabilities of the presented model in an
interaction scenario between Vince and the human
interlocutor.
The interaction scenario consists of a game between the
human and the agent. To this end, Vince has been equipped
with a dialog manager component that manages the inter-
action and controls corresponding verbal behavior. The
overall course of the interaction is as follows:
(1) Vince greets the human interlocutor and explains the
game
(2) Human’s turn: The human interlocutor performs a
gesture while Vince observes
(3) If Vince recognizes the gesture as familiar:
(3.1) Recognition: Vince says the name of the recog-
nized gesture schema
(3.2) Vince imitates the gesture by performing the
gesture schema prototype and asks for
confirmation
(3.3) If the interlocutor rejects the imitation: go to (4.2)
learning
(3.4) Otherwise, if the interlocutor confirms the guess:
go to (5) Vince’s turn
(4) Otherwise, if Vince detects an unfamiliar gesture:
(4.1) Vince states the performed gesture was unknown
to him
(4.2) Learning: Vince asks for the label of the gesture
(4.3) Human interlocutor gives a label for the gesture
(4.4) Vince acquires the observed gesture and labels the
schema accordingly
(4.5) Vince re-produces the newly learned gesture
(5) Vince’s turn: Vince randomly performs a gesture
from his own repertoire and asks for its name
(6) The interlocutor guesses the label of the performed
gesture
(7) If the label matches, Vince confirms the guess; if not,
Vince corrects the interlocutor
(8) If the interlocutor does not end the game: go to (2)
Human’s turn
(9) Vince says goodbye.
This scenario imposes a number of challenges of pro-
cessing and using social signals, which are prevalent also in
natural human face-to-face interaction. The following
sections report how our model accomplishes them:
‘‘Detecting and Learning New Gestures’’ discusses how the
Fig. 5 Setup: the virtual agent Vince (left) and the perceived body posture augmented with wrist positions (middle), while a human user
performs a waving gesture (right)
1 http://www.mesa-imaging.ch.
2 http://www.softkinetic.net.
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virtual agent detects and acquires new gestures from
observation. Section ‘‘Recognizing Familiar Gestures’’
describes how Vince recognizes familiar gestures in a fast,
incremental, and robust manner. Furthermore, top-down
and bottom-up resonances in this process are illustrated and
discussed. Finally, ‘‘Perception-Action Integration’’ shows
how the perception-action integration improves the inter-
action through behavior coordination and attention guid-
ance on the part of the agent.
Detecting and Learning New Gestures
At the beginning of the interaction, Vince has an empty
motor knowledge and is ready to observe new gestures.
The following analysis refers to steps (2–4) of our scenario.
As first gesture, we presented Vince a waving gesture,
performed with the right hand at about the height of the
head (wave1 in Fig. 7; see Fig. 6 (left) for the trajectory).
Since the motor knowledge does not possess any candidate
at either level, the model switches immediately to inverse
models. Preprocessing and motor command inverse models
yield movement segments and guiding strokes (shown in
Fig. 6) which are added as motor commands at the lowest
level of motor knowledge. At the next level, this motor
command sequence is acquired as a new motor program,
referred to as wave1. Afterward, Vince asks for a label and
recognizes the word ‘‘waving’’ which is then assigned to a
newly created motor schema waving, associated with the
motor program wave1. The resulting structures is shown in
Fig. 8a.
In the next round, we presented Vince another waving
gesture wave2, performed with a more outstretched right
arm (see Fig. 7). Since there is only one motor hypothesis
at each level, all hypotheses attain a probability of 1.
However, the likelihood average, shown in Fig. 6 (right), is
too low to push Vince’s confidence in observing the ges-
ture wave1 above the threshold (see ‘‘Bottom-Up Percep-
tion’’ for further details about this issue). Vince hence
detects another new gesture (step 4) in the interaction) and
creates new motor commands (shown in Fig. 6) as well as a
new motor program wave2. However, since the user
labeled the new performance ‘‘waving’’, the motor program
is associated with the same motor schema waving (Fig. 8a).
Figure 11 shows the learned gesture performed by Vince.
In two further rounds the interlocutor performed two
other gestures (see Fig. 7): shaping a flat surface by
Fig. 6 From left to right the observed trajectory of the wave1
gesture; the created guiding strokes for wave1; guiding strokes after
learning a second waving performance, wave2; the likelihood average
of wave1 while observing gesture wave2 (the horizontal line indicates
the recognition threshold of 0.7 for the average likelihood)
Fig. 7 Snapshots from a human
interlocutor performing four
different gestures, labeled as the
corresponding motor programs:
wave1, wave2, surface1 and
circle1
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moving the right hand horizontally in front of himself, and
a circle gesture. In the former case, at the end of the per-
formance, the motor program hypothesis of wave2 attains
stronger motor resonance because of a greater similarity to
the starting movement of the demonstrated gesture. How-
ever, the average likelihood value for that hypothesis is
29% of the maximum likelihood which is clearly lower
than the rejection threshold, empirically set to 70%.
Therefore, the surface gesture is determined as unfamiliar;
it is learned and inserted as a new motor program (sur-
face1) into the motor knowledge and a new schema (sur-
face) is created. Likewise, in the case of the circle gesture,
Vince’s motor knowledge is augmented with further motor
commands, a motor program and a motor schema. Fig-
ure 8a shows the shared motor knowledge of Vince after
these four rounds of interaction.
Recognizing Familiar Gestures
After the previous interaction, we meet Vince as an
embodied agent with some motor expertise on his own.
Thus, we can investigate the case of recognizing familiar
gestures based on resonances in the own repertoire (steps
(2–3) in the our scenario). We analyze this for two cases:
First, we turn off top-down motor guidance and focus on
the bottom-up perception process. Afterward, we compare
this with combined both bottom-up and top-down pro-
cessing applied to exactly the same recognition scenario.
Simulation of Bottom-Up Perception
We presented Vince a waving gesture similar to the first
performance wave1. Figure 9 (top) shows how motor res-
onances in Vince’s motor system (viz. confidences in
hypotheses) evolve during the course of perceiving this
gesture. The forward model at motor program level creates
one hypothesis for each of the four known gesture per-
formances. Overall, there are three known gesture sche-
mas: waving, circle and surface. Since the demonstrated
gesture starts similarly to the known circle gesture, Vince
at first ‘‘thinks’’ that the interlocutor is going to draw a
circle. However, after 3.5 s, the resonance of motor pro-
gram wave1 is stronger than that of circle1, and from about
second 4.0 on Vince recognizes the wave1 performance
reliably. Note also that right from the beginning of the
performance Vince is quite sure he is observing a waving
schema. The reason is that he has experienced twice as
many waving gestures as other gestures in his short life.
This effect is wanted and emphasizes a developmental
perspective of our approach to learning social signal pro-
cessing. This ‘‘assimilation bias’’ will wash out as Vince
sees more and more different performances (in fact, when
(a) (b)
Fig. 8 a The acquired hierarchical motor knowledge after observing
four gestures within the scenario; b observed trajectories (dashed)
overlaid on the space of guiding strokes (solid). Top-left: trajectory
for the surface1 gesture and waving guiding strokes; top-right learned
surface1 motor commands; bottom-left: trajectory of gesture circle1;
bottom-right: guiding stroke space containing learned motor com-
mands for all four gestures
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presenting this gesture to Vince after he has learned not
two but only one waving gesture, the motor schemas
confidences evolve identically to those at the motor pro-
gram level). When we now present Vince another perfor-
mance of circle1 (Fig. 9, bottom), the agent again
recognizes this motor program already 1.5 s after the onset
of the demonstration. The bias toward waving gestures, as
evidenced by the early resonances of the wave schema,
diminishes after about 3 s and the circle schema prevails.
Simulation of Integrated Bottom-Up and Top-Down Motor
Guidances
Now, consider the resulting motor resonances when the
agent, employing the same motor knowledge and being
demonstrated exactly the same waving gesture, uses both
bottom-up and top-down processing. Figure 10 compares
the emerging motor resonances, with and without top-down
guidance. Since hypotheses are now confirmed or rejected
by both higher and lower levels, the motor resonances are
more stable and respond faster, such that Vince determines
likely hypotheses earlier. In this case, the motor program
wave1 is also activated by the more probable waving
schema and is recognized about 2.5 s earlier than in the
sole bottom-up processing case. Likewise, associated
motor commands are also more expected to be observed.
Note that both bottom-up and top-down processes
update the probabilistic motor resonances ‘‘at each time
step’’. That means, the gradient of belief variation depends
on the frequency with which these update methods are
applied: the more frequently the hypotheses are updated,
the steeper their belief variations are. In the results pre-
sented here, we have applied both processes with fre-
quencies of 10 Hz which have to be set empirically as
parameters according to two criteria: (1) how fast the
beliefs should be updated given the frame rate of the
Fig. 9 Bottom-up motor resonances at all three levels (MC motor commands, MP motor programs, MS motor schemas) while observing wave1
gesture (top) and while observing gesture circle1 (bottom)
Fig. 10 Comparison of motor resonances at all three levels while observing wave1 with only bottom-up percolation (dashed lines) or top-down
guidance integrated (solid lines)
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tracking system and, (2) how strong the relative effects of
top-down and bottom-up processes should be. This means,
for example, performing bottom-up process more fre-
quently than top-down process simulates a virtual agent
who relies primarily on his sensory input when recognizing
a movement, rather than his higher-level beliefs and
speculations.
Perception-Action Integration
In our interaction scenario, there are situations which
demonstrate, and benefit from, the interaction between
perception and generation of gestural behavior. Next, we
analyze an example of how perception affects the follow-
ing generation process. Then we show how generating a
gesture primes the agent’s attention in the following per-
ception process.
Generation after Observation
After conducting the same training session as above in
which Vince has learned three schemas (see Fig. 8), we
presented the agent three further performances of wave1
during further rounds of the game (i.e. step 3). Therefore,
the corresponding motor program wave1 has been
encountered four times overall and the alternative waving
performance wave2 has been seen once. If Vince now
decided to wave (i.e., it selects the schema waving at
scenario step 5), he would perform wave1 as the
prototypical performance. Now, in the next round of the
game at step (2), we performed a gesture similar to wave2.
This performance is recognized by Vince as a familiar
gesture and increases the observation frequency of wave2,
which however is still half of the frequency of wave1. That
is, the generation likelihood P(s|p) is 0.5 (cf. ‘‘Perception-
Action Integration’’). Now, it is Vince’s turn (step 5) to
generate a gesture and he decides to wave. The previous
perception of the wave2 gesture has evoked an according
motor activation, which remains active for a while (here,
set to 2 s for motor commands, 4 s for motor programs and
6 s for motor schemas). Since Vince intends to wave before
the motor activation of wave2 decreases to a value lower
than its likelihood (equal to 0.5, in this case), the agent
chooses the same waving performance as the one it has
recently observed, i.e. wave2, and not its individually
preferred way of waving, namely wave1 (see Fig. 11).
Observation After Generation
The effect of the generation process on perception is seen
at step (2) when the human user performs a gesture after
Vince has generated one himself (5–8). We simulate two
recognition cases: First, when Vince did perform wave1
previously and, second, when Vince did not generate any
gesture previously (recognition case described in ‘‘Recog-
nizing Familiar Gestures’’). Figure 12 shows the resulting
motor resonances at the motor program level during
observation of wave1 in both cases. When Vince has
PerformingObserving
wave1
surface1 & circle1
wave2
Fig. 11 Left Vince performing
the wave2 gesture, after
observing the same gesture
performed by the human user;
right motor activations while
observing and performing
waving gestures; high
activations of the wave2 motor
program prime the performance
of the same gesture, albeit
wave1 is generally preferred
Fig. 12 Left Vince while
performing wave1 gesture; right
motor resonances at motor
program level during
observation of wave1 with
(solid lines) or without (dashed
lines) previous self-performance
of the same gesture
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previously performed wave1 himself, the corresponding
motor components are activated and his sensitivity is
primed toward the same behavior. In result, Vince imme-
diately recognizes the demonstrated wave1 gesture right
after the interlocutor has started to move, and the following
observations confirm this expectation. He thus responds
about 2 s earlier to the human’s demonstration (step 3).
Related Work
Coupling of perception and generation for transitive and
intransitive actions is a hot topic in computational model-
ing, from both the engineering view of robotics [28–31]
and from the (social) cognitive science perspective [21, 32–
37]. In almost all of these studies, the main focus is on
imitation as a learning mechanism which links perception
to action in an artificial agent. The applied methods for this
aim to fulfill a continuum of requirements, from (neuro)
biologically inspired ones, to more technical and task-ori-
ented approaches.
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs), which are commonly
used for automatic speech recognition [38], are the most
popular modeling tool used for analyzing movements in
technical robotics [28, 30, 31, 39]. Although HMMs have
become established in movement recognition and even
generation [30], they are bounded to some methodological
restrictions, which arise especially in social interaction
between humans and artificial agents. In order to apply
HMMs as movement classifiers, the number of HMM states
needs to be found empirically [28, 31] or by applying
additional criteria to ‘‘available’’ data [40, 41]. Hence, such
a model cannot guarantee its flexibility in classifying new
unpredicted movements. Furthermore, HMMs as move-
ment recognizers need to be fed with the whole movement
sequence to compute the corresponding generation proba-
bility (usually by applying the Viterbi algorithm [38]). This
is due to the necessary preprocessing step which maps
observed data to clusters, as inputs of the corresponding
HMM states (e.g., Calinon and Billard [41] have applied
principle component analysis (PCA); Aleotti and Caselli
[28] have used distance-based geometric clustering).
Therefore, although those HMMs are also applied as online
and incremental learning methods [30, 42], and they sim-
ulate human recognition ability better than many classical
off-line and batch-learning approaches employed by
robotic studies [36, 41], they are still not fast enough for
human social interaction. In many cases, humans need to
recognize a communicative movement already during its
performance to (re)act fast and in a social manner. Our
probabilistic method updates the agent’s belief in observ-
ing familiar movements at each time step during observa-
tion. Furthermore, in recognition mode there is no
restriction on the length of the given observation sequence.
Hence, the model is robust against duration variability of
movements to any extent.
Besides other probabilistic methods (such as Dynamic
Bayesian Networks [29], or Gaussian Mixture Models
[42]), connectionist algorithms are neurobiologically
inspired approaches, which are mostly applied to model
mirror neurons as links between visual perception of
movement and motor commands [21, 43, 44]. The disad-
vantage of such connectionist algorithms, on the one hand,
is the fact that they need a high number of training data to
converge and be applied as classifiers (which make them
suitable for developmental modeling). On the other hand,
their parameters and subprocesses are not analyzable with
respect to the given problem. In contrast, applying sym-
bolic probabilistic algorithms allows further interpretation
of single terms and components of the method concerning
modeled cognitive processes. For example, in the present
model, the terms likelihood, prior and posterior probabili-
ties also indicate their role in the corresponding cognitive
processes, similar to their mathematical denotations.
Modular architectures of forward and inverse models
were initially proposed for motor control as the MOSAIC
architecture [19, 45]. In the following work [32, 33] this
architecture has shown its capability in action recognition
by applying forward models as predictors, which can be
employed to assess their corresponding movement
hypotheses against observation. The MOSAIC architecture
represents movements through related predictors and con-
trollers in a modular system. However, in our model, we
have applied these internal models as generic processors
performing their tasks on a central representation of motor
knowledge. In this context, the forward and inverse models
are functionally similar to the concept of simulators as in
the perceptual symbol system theory [46]. These simulators
perform forward and inverse simulations by applying the
shared hierarchical motor knowledge. Haruno et al. [47]
have extended MOSAIC to a hierarchical architecture
(HMOSAIC), which can perform bidirectional information
processing (top-down and bottom-up) between different
levels of motor knowledge. The hierarchical representation
is similar to our shared motor knowledge and consists of
three different levels of abstraction: kinematics move-
ments, sequences of actions, and goals and intentions of
actions. Hierarchical representation of actions has been
applied by many other studies, for instance, in order to
solve correspondence problem of transitive actions [48], or
to use motor primitives as building blocks for more com-
plex actions [30, 36]. Alternatively, in recent work [49]
Kru¨ger et al. have applied parametric HMMs (PHMMs) for
recognizing and synthesizing transitive movements. In this
way, different HMMs representing different movements
that vary due to different parametrizations can be collapsed
432 Cogn Comput (2011) 3:419–435
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into a single HMM. However, except for the HMOSAIC
architecture in [47], none of the aforementioned approaches
so far have considered the top-down aspect of recognition as
a cognitive process, in form of information propagation
coming from more abstract motor representations. Con-
cerning the probability propagation in terms of bidirectional
interaction between levels of motor knowledge, the
approach employed in [47] is close to our work: the input of
higher-level modules is the bottom-up posterior probability
and the output is a set of top-down probabilities, acting to
prioritize lower-level module selection.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an approach for realizing
social artificial agents, based on principles of embodied
cognition. We assume two key components for this: First,
‘‘horizontal integration’’ between perception and action
such that own motor knowledge is utilized for a better
recognition and understanding of others’ behavior. This
can be achieved by prediction-evaluation schemes, which
are likely to reside on various levels of the sensorimotor
hierarchy. Second, ‘‘vertical integration’’ which refers to a
combination of bottom-up and top-down flow of informa-
tion in this hierarchy. Bottom-up resonance amounts to
attributing an intention to a gesture performed by the
interaction partner, whereas top-down guidance informs
and guides this process with hypotheses derived from prior
and context-dependent knowledge.
We have presented, for the case of natural hand-arm
gestures, a model that accounts for both kinds of integra-
tion. The main components of our model are (1) a hierar-
chy of shared motor knowledge from kinematic features of
movement segments (modeled through motor commands)
to complete movements (motor programs) to more general
prototype representations (motor schemas); (2) a probabi-
listic approach to create resonances in these structures
when applied for predicting and evaluating movement
hypotheses against incoming observations; (3) inverse
models to build up and augment these motor knowledge
structures from observing and imitating novel gestures; (4)
generation processes that exploit these structures for
behavior production. With these components, an interac-
tion of perception and generation could easily be modeled
by imposing dynamic activation upon the shared structures,
and by devising ways to evoke and respond to such acti-
vations in behavior perception and production.
While a growing interest in cognitively and (neuro)bio-
logically inspired modeling could be observed over the last
years, tenets of embodied cognition like perception-action
links are mainly adopted in technical approaches to imi-
tation learning. We, however, argue that the integration of
perception and action, both horizontally and vertically, is
still not sufficiently considered in computational modeling
of social behavior. Imitation has been treated mostly as a
one-way interaction, from a human demonstrator to an
artificial agent as imitator. In this context, further bi-
directional social phenomena, resulting from perception-
action links, are ignored. For instance, the direct effect of
perception on action, and action on perception (which lead
to phenomena like priming, alignment and mimicry) are
highly relevant topics in social cognitive science and
should be considered as requirements for modeling social
interaction. In the present work, we have tried to fulfill
these requirements to some extent, while further refine-
ments are required to position the model more clearly with
respect to such cognitive phenomena. However, we have
shown that the proposed computational model has the
potential to capture and simulate such cognitive require-
ments. We have evaluated our model with real-world data
(noisy gesture trajectories obtained with marker-free,
camera-based body tracking). The results we have obtained
are promising. Future work will have to scale this model up
in terms of the number of gestures, further significant
gesture features like hand shape, as well as higher levels of
social and referential meaning. Nevertheless, we are con-
fident that an integrated model as presented here is an
important step, not only in investigating cognitively plau-
sible computational models of social interaction, but also in
building interactive artificial agents that can engage with
their users in reciprocal interactions in a more adaptive,
human-like and sociable way.
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